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Natural and Artificial Impartiality 




Under the influence of social contract theory, political philosophers typically assume that it is the 
job of participants in, and only participants in, a given scheme of social cooperation to determine 
how it is to be run. Yet since participants in a given scheme are always biased, the formulation of 
fair principles or policies requires that they adopt an imagined impartial perspective—which I 
term artificial impartiality. John Rawls’s appeal to the original position is the classic example of 
such artificial impartiality; Adam Smith’s appeal to an impartial spectator has recently been 
interpreted along similar lines. Smith’s impartial spectators, however, are real more often than 
they are imaginary; Smith believes that with regard to most conflicts in which we are not 
participants most of us are naturally impartial. This essay argues that an easy way to improve 
theorizing about justice is to shift the focus from participant perspectives (including their 
imagined, artificial constructs of impartiality) to the perspective of naturally impartial spectators. 
While artificial impartiality must continue to play an important role in political philosophizing, it 
will work more effectively in conjunction with greater use of natural impartiality. 
 
 
The ways in which we interpret philosophers of the past can reveal much about the blind 
spots of philosophy in the present. Nowhere is this more diagnostically revealing than with the 
undue emphasis on the imaginary over the actual in recent discussions of Adam Smith’s 
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conception of an “impartial spectator” (1976/1790). Amartya Sen, for example, says that “the 
Smithian ‘impartial spectator’” is primarily “a device for critical scrutiny and public discussion” 
(2009, 135). Like the impossibly ignorant agents in John Rawls’s “original position” 
(1999/1971)—or, in an even closer analogy, like the “ideal observer” first described by Roderick 
Firth (1952)—this impartial spectator is not a real person, but the protagonist of a thought 
experiment. By appealing to this imagined figure, Smith is thought to be primarily concerned 
with constructing an artificial perspective which any of us can and should adopt at will in order 
to provide the proper viewpoint for moral evaluation, rather than describing a social category to 
which some of us may already belong.    
Yet while none of us ever find ourselves suddenly behind Rawls’s “veil of ignorance,” or 
in the position of Firth’s ideal observer, we are all regularly impartial spectators. As T. D. 
Campbell observes, in most instances where Smith speaks of an impartial spectator, he is merely 
speaking of “the ordinary person when he is in the position of observing the behavior of any 
person with whom he has no special connection and whose behavior does not affect him more or 
less than it affects anyone else” (Campbell 1975, 70–71; see also Campbell 1971, 134–145). 
Whenever we find ourselves evaluating competing claims in a conflict where we have nothing at 
stake and in which we have no affinity for any participant over any other, we are in the position 
of an impartial spectator. There is nothing either unusual or praiseworthy about being in this 
position. Smith’s impartial spectator is an ideal type primarily in the Weberian, descriptive-
sociological sense, and only secondarily in the normative, moral sense. 
Throughout Smith’s ethics, the perspective most often taken is of a disinterested spectator 
evaluating the actions of others. Only later does Smith set out to explain why, when we are not in 
the position of an impartial spectator—when we form moral evaluations of our friends, family or 
 3 
ourselves, for example—we still feel that our moral judgments ought to remain impartial. It is 
then, and only then, that we must artificially attempt to examine our conduct or that of those 
close to us “as we imagine any other fair and impartial spectator would examine it” (Smith 
1976/1790, III.1.2). To overcome our natural perspective in this way is a morally praiseworthy 
feat of imagination, one which we typically fail to accomplish fully. Smith’s discussion of these 
cases legitimately inspires Sen and others today to describe an imaginary impartial spectator as a 
“device” for improving moral judgment. Yet such cases, for Smith, are the exception, and not the 
rule (Martin 1990, 118; Frazer 2010, 95–96). In most of our judgments of most other people 
most of the time, Smith believed that our natural impartiality as spectators was sufficient to 
produce fair and unbiased conclusions, without appeal to an imagined spectator of greater 
impartiality than our own.  
Regardless of whether Smith was correct in believing that this is true most of the time, it 
is certainly true at least some of the time. In this respect, the natural perspective of impartial 
spectators can be a valuable resource for fair judgments in both philosophy and practice. This is 
a resource, however, which most recent philosophers have chosen to forego. Convinced that 
those who do not actively participate in a scheme of mutual cooperation need have no say in 
determining the fairness of that cooperation, most today exclude all spectators—impartial or 
otherwise—from the formulation of principles of justice. In order to achieve impartiality, 
participants in social cooperation are imagined to rely entirely on their own ability to screen out 
the natural biases caused by their competing interests.  
This essay is an attempt to shift theorists of justice away from exclusive focus on the 
perspective of participants in social cooperation to include consideration of the perspective of 
impartial spectators, ending the exclusive reliance on what I call artificial impartiality in a way 
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that makes room for what I call natural impartiality. Such a shift in perspective would not only 
serve to improve theories of justice, like Sen’s own, which take direct inspiration from Smith’s 
conception of an impartial spectator. More generally, it would make impartial theories of justice 
both easier to formulate in theory and easier to implement in practice with the right institutional 
design.2 To be sure, the mere fact that one philosophical approach is easier than another is not 
necessarily a decisive reason to adopt it. Like many things worth doing in life, formulating 
impartial theories of justice may be unavoidably difficult. There is no reason, however, to make 
it any more difficult than it needs to be. 
 
Background and definitions 
 Questions of justice arise in social situations where, although individuals may have many 
interests in common, they also have interests in conflict. Following Rawls, who in turn was 
following David Hume and Smith, recent theorists of justice have understood society as such to 
be a scheme of mutual cooperation in which imperfectly altruistic individuals wish to increase 
their share of the benefits from this cooperation while decreasing their share of the burdens. It is 
taken as axiomatic that principles of justice designed to resolve such conflict should be impartial 
in the sense they should not favor the interests of any parties to a given conflict over those of any 
others. Ideally, impartiality should be absolute—no greater weight whatsoever may be given to 
the interests of any party to a given conflict. In our less than perfect world, however, we can also 
speak of impartiality as a matter of degree. Although some favor may be shown to the interests 
of some parties over others, the decision which results is more impartial (or, less partial) than one 
in which even greater favor is shown.  
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 The central distinction of this essay is between two ways that individuals can experience 
the moral demand for impartiality. In cases of natural impartiality, the demand isn’t actually 
demanding at all. In such cases, one simply has no interest in favoring and no reason to favor the 
interests of one participant in a given conflict over those of any other. (For purposes of this 
essay, I can remain agnostic on the infamously complex relationship between interests in 
something being done and reasons to do that something.) To make use of the visual metaphors so 
common in this area, we can say that, from the perspective of those with natural impartiality, all 
parties to a conflict look the same. Naturally impartial individuals see the interests at stake from 
a distance sufficient to obscure any differences between them which might lead us to treat them 
unequally. As with impartiality in general, we can also speak of natural impartiality as a matter 
of degree. Individuals shows greater natural impartiality than they otherwise might to the extent 
that they have less of an interest in favoring some over others.  
  Natural impartiality in this sense can be contrasted with artificial impartiality. Here, 
although one has a reason to favor the interests of one party to a given conflict, one also has a 
reason to not do so. This latter is a reason to disregard the former. That is, one has a reason to 
view the dispute as if one had natural impartiality, to see the situation in a way that makes all 
parties look the same even though they do not appear so initially. Such impartiality is artificial in 
the sense that it involves adopting a perspective on the situation which is not naturally one’s 
own. In order to achieve artificial impartiality, an individual must impose what David Hume 
called “a proper violence on his imagination” (Hume 1985/1777, 240). When we speak of 
artificial impartiality as a matter of degree, we are speaking of the extent to which individuals 
succeed in departing imaginatively from their natural perspective on the world, adopting some 
such artificial perspective in its place. 
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Committed as they are to democracy, recent theorists of justice have taken the 
responsibility to determine impartial principles of justice to reside only with the parties to a 
conflict themselves. The paradigmatic case to be resolved is isolated from all outside influence. 
Ronald Dworkin (2002) imagines castaways dividing up the resources on a desert island, while 
Bruce Ackerman (1981) describes the crew of a spaceship drawing up principles of justice to 
govern their colonization of an uninhabited planet. These are not isolated examples; the 
operating assumption of virtually all ‘contractarian’ (and/or ‘contractualist’) social theory is that 
participants in a conflict are responsible for drafting their own social contract.  
What qualifies parties in a given conflict as parties is that their own, first-order interests 
are at stake. By first-order interests, I mean interests which do not make reference to other 
interests, either one’s own or those of anyone else. An interest I may have in advancing the 
interests of someone else, or the interest I have in advancing my own first-order interests, is an 
example of what I will call a higher-order interest. 
The distinction between first- and higher-order interests is different from the distinction 
which is often made between self- and other-regarding interests. All other-regarding interests are 
higher-order interests, since they necessarily make reference to the interests of others. Yet not all 
higher-order interests are other-regarding, since they can also make reference to one’s own 
interests. Nor do I believe all first-order interests to be self-regarding. While it is true that first-
order interests cannot be other-regarding, the distinction between self- and other-regarding 
interests is not exhaustive. We can also have what can be called principle-regarding interests, 
perhaps grounded in what Rawls called “principle-dependent desires” (see Rawls 2000). Such 
interests do not make any reference to one’s own interests, but they also do not make reference to 
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the interests of others. Instead, one takes a direct, first-order interest in abiding by some 
principle, moral or otherwise. 
When the first-order interests of an individual are at stake in a conflict, that individual 
may find herself actively taking part in the settlement of the conflict. Yet I will classify 
individuals as parties to a conflict solely on the basis that their first-order interests are at stake, 
even if they are not actively involved in defending them, or in settling the dispute any other way. 
Those who are not actively involved in a conflict although their first-order interests are at stake 
can be called passive parties in the conflict, as opposed to active parties. The distinction between 
active and passive parties in a conflict may have important repercussions for some theories of 
justice—particularly those concerning international justice, where the interests of those outside a 
given state may be profoundly affected by the results of deliberations in which they, as non-
citizens, are excluded from active participation. 
 A spectator can be understood as an individual whose first-order interests are not at stake 
in a given conflict. The distinction between parties to and spectators of a conflict is exhaustive. 
With regards to any given conflict, all of us are either parties or spectators. All of us either have 
first-order interests involved or we do not; all of us are either inside the conflict or outside it. Of 
course, passive parties may be outside in the different sense that they are not actively involved in 
settling the matter, but their interests remain inside even if their voices do not. 
While passive parties may not be actively involved in a given conflict despite the fact that 
they have first-order interests at stake in it, spectators may become involved in a given conflict 
even though they have no first-order interests at stake. When they are involved, they cannot be 
involved in the same way that active parties often are—involved, that is, through defending their 
first-order interests. By definition, they have no first-order interests to defend. While they may 
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become involved so as to defend their second-order interests, active spectators can also become 
involved as arbitrators—those who take a role in a dispute involving the interests of others. 
 
Claim 1. Being a spectator of, rather than a party to, a given conflict is necessary, but not 
sufficient, for absolute natural impartiality. 
In order to defend Claim 1, it is first necessary to refute the opposing claim that it is not 
necessary to be a spectator to a given conflict to have absolute natural impartiality—that 
participants, too, are capable of absolute natural impartiality. It is then necessary to refute the 
quite different opposing claim that being a spectator of, rather than a participant in, a given 
conflict is sufficient for absolute natural impartiality. 
1. In order to address the first of these counter-claims, I must make clear that I refuse to 
assume that participants in a conflict are purely self-interested. First, I am happy to admit that 
virtually all of us (with the possible exception of clinical psychopaths) have other-regarding 
interests—that is, higher-order interests in seeing that the interests of others are advanced. Other-
regarding interests may have emotional foundations in sympathy or fellow-feeling, but they may 
also stem from a more direct desire to see others thrive for their own sake. We may also have a 
self-regarding, second-order interest in advancing the interest of others or pursuing impartial 
principles to govern our cooperation, since doing so is often the best available means of 
achieving our first-order interests. We may also have strong, first-order, principle-dependent 
interests—interests which make no reference to our own interests or those of anyone else. For 
example, we may have a principle-dependent interest in determining and abiding by fair terms of 
social cooperation, or acting only on principles which no other participant in a given situation 
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can reasonably reject. We may even have first-order, principle-dependent interest in being 
impartial simply for its own sake. 
 In order to establish that parties to a conflict cannot have absolute natural impartiality, it 
is sufficient to show that their (first- or higher-order) interests in impartiality cannot be the only 
first-order interests at stake in a conflict. The most obvious way to defend this claim is through 
appeal to the empirical realities of human psychology. Although we can grant the reality of both 
principle-dependent, first-order and other-regarding, higher-order interests, none would deny that 
we also have self-regarding first-order interests. In a world of limited resources, our self-
regarding interests will often come into conflict with both our own other-regarding interests and 
the self-regarding-interests of others. It is this conflict which impartial principles of justice are 
meant to resolve, and without which they would not be necessary. As long as parties to a conflict 
have self-regarding as well as other-regarding interests at stake, they have an interest in favoring 
their own selfish interests over those of others, and are not absolutely naturally impartial. Their 
other-regarding and principle-dependent interests may give them both a relatively high degree of 
natural impartiality and a very strong reason to strive for absolute artificial impartiality, but they 
cannot provide them with absolute natural impartiality as long as conflicting, self-regarding 
interests are also at stake. 
While sufficient, this appeal to the empirical reality of conflicting self-regarding interests 
is actually unnecessary to prove my point. The point can also be defended conceptually. In order 
for a conflict to qualify as such, the parties to a conflict must have competing first-order 
interests. Of course, we can imagine a world without competing interests—and hence without 
conflict—but this would be a world in which issues of justice do not arise. The natural 
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impartiality of participants grows greater only as impartiality becomes less necessary—that is, as 
conflicts grow weaker—and becomes absolute only when conflict disappears entirely.  
It is also important to note that even a world of saints whose only first-order interests are 
in abiding by impartial principles would not necessarily be a world without conflict. Different 
saints might interpret the demands of impartiality differently; their competing first-order interests 
might involve abiding by these different, allegedly impartial principles. Despite their strong 
commitment to impartiality, in the conflict between these principles they would not be absolutely 
naturally impartial. They may nonetheless have both a relatively high degree of natural 
impartiality and a very strong commitment to resolving the dispute through some form of 
artificial impartiality.  
2. Just as the mere fact that parties to a conflict may have strong interests in impartiality 
does not render them absolutely naturally impartial, so too does the mere fact that one is a 
spectator to a given conflict does not imply that one is absolutely naturally impartial with regard 
to it. First, and most obviously, a spectator may have a greater higher-order interest in advancing 
the first-order interests of some parties to a conflict than they do in advancing the first-order 
interests of others. Our other-regarding, higher-order interests often come into conflict—as when 
the first-order interests of the children of one pair of selfless parents are in conflict with the first-
order interests of another’s. Parents are notoriously partial arbitrators of conflicts between their 
children: My little angel was clearly in the right when he punched your brat, and you probably 
believe the same about your little angel when he punched back. Partial spectators with other-
regarding, higher-order interests which favor the first-order interests of different participants in a 
given conflict can themselves be understood as higher-order parties to the conflict. 
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Yet spectators do not need to have a strong higher-order interest in the first-order 
interests of only some of the participants in a conflict in order to remain naturally partial. There 
are many reasons a spectator might choose to favor the interests of some over others, some of 
which might be tied only very loosely to the spectator’s own interests, higher-order or otherwise. 
A biased spectator might simply take a liking to a particular participant and a disliking to others, 
for reasons that might not be entirely explicable. Taking a shine to some participants and 
developing an inexplicable antipathy to others might not give one a very strong higher-order 
interest in their first-order interests, but it nonetheless may be sufficient to prevent absolute 
natural impartiality. As with parties whose own first-order interests are at stake, however, even 
partial spectators may both show a significant degree of natural impartiality and have very good 
reasons for overcoming their natural biases through appeal to artificial impartiality. 
 
Claim 2: The natural impartiality of a spectator is sometimes sufficient to render fair 
judgment without appeal to artificial impartiality. 
 The basic insight behind Rawls’s original position is that when we are entirely blind to 
the differences between participants in a conflict, differences which otherwise might lead us to 
favor the interests of one over others, the principles we construct for resolving the conflict will 
be absolutely impartial. Since Rawls assumed that parties to the conflict would themselves be the 
ones formulating the principles, he argued that it was necessary to obscure the differences among 
them behind an imagined veil of ignorance. Since, as has now been established, no party to a 
conflict is entirely naturally impartial, Rawls is correct in believing that some such device of 
artificial impartiality is necessary for such purposes.  
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 The situation changes, however, when it is spectators of rather than parties to a conflict 
who are asked to formulate impartial principles to resolve a conflict. In cases where these 
spectators are naturally partial to some degree, a device of artificial impartiality may also be 
necessary for them. Yet there are also cases in which spectators are naturally impartial—if not 
absolutely so, then at least sufficiently so to render reasonably fair judgments. 
 Real-world spectators to conflicts, through no doing of their own, may be as blind to the 
differences between participants in a conflict as are the imaginary agents behind the veil of 
ignorance. The blindness may be a result of simple ignorance—here real rather than imagined. 
But it may persist even in a situation of full information. From the point of view of a sufficiently 
detached spectator, there may simply be no relevant differences to see, and hence no reason to 
favor the interests of one party to a conflict over another.  
 Of course, there is still a possibility of partiality in these cases by arbitrary whim. Simply 
knowing that spectators have no noticeable reason to favor any participant in a conflict—that 
they have no personal connections to any of the parties involved, or particular affinities for some 
over others—is not sufficient to establish their absolute natural impartiality. There is still a 
possibility of arbitrary favoritism. Only the introspection of the spectators themselves can reveal 
that such capriciousness is not at work, and even they cannot know with any certainty whether 
such factors are at play on a subconscious level. Yet even though the fact that a certain group of 
spectators are utterly detached from all the participants in a conflict is not sufficient to establish 
that they are absolutely naturally impartial, that fact is nonetheless good evidence that they 
probably have a relatively high degree of natural impartiality. Arbitrary whims are rarely known 
for their strength or vehemence, after all. 
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 What is more, there are real-world techniques that spectators can use to increase their 
natural impartiality but that are unavailable to participants. If the appearance (including the race 
and gender) of a potential bandmate would bias an audition process, candidates can perform 
behind a curtain—a practical analogue to the veil of ignorance. To take an example more 
familiar to the likely readers of this essay, if the name of the author of an academic article would 
bias reviewers, a journal can establish a system of blind review. Such techniques are unavailable 
to parties to a conflict. Short of a lobotomy, there is no way to increase their natural ignorance of 
the interests and identities of the parties to a conflict, since these interests and identities are their 
own. While journal editors and bandleaders can experiment with real-world techniques to 
increase the impartiality of spectator-judges, only thought experiments are available to 
participant-judges. 
These real-world techniques are deliberate contrivances and, in that sense, they are 
artificial. Yet the impartiality which results from them is still natural impartiality in the relevant 
sense, since the spectators involved are still viewing the world from their own, everyday 
perspective. Nor do they deserve any moral credit for doing so. The journal editor who 
establishes a system of blind review may be deserving of praise for his sense of fairness, but the 
reviewer who simply never learns the name of the author of an article is not praiseworthy by 
virtue of the natural impartiality which results from such unchosen ignorance. 
 Through a combination of the detached position from which they view a conflict and the 
use of techniques designed to shield them from possible sources of bias, spectators may reach a 
very high degree of natural impartiality. Even if we can never be certain that a natural 
impartiality is absolute, it seems reasonable to suppose that, at least in some situations, it would 
be sufficient to render judgments quite fair indeed, and to do so without the need for further 
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appeal to some form of artificial impartiality. And in those cases where the natural impartiality of 
spectators is insufficient to render an adequately fair judgment, the greater is the degree of 
natural impartiality that the spectators already possess, the easier it would be for them to achieve 
the artificial impartiality necessary to do so. Mere whims and weak second-order interests are 
relatively easy to overcome through sufficient imaginative effort when compared with stronger 
first- or second-order interests.  
Of course, there are difficult questions of what degree of impartiality is necessary for 
judgments to qualify as fair, and of how fair judgments need to be for purposes of adequate 
justice. I will not try to put forward an elaborate theory of when a high but imperfect degree of 
justice or fairness can be considered good enough in our always imperfect world—a theory of 
justifiable complacency, if you will. But there is no doubt that utopian dreams of perfect justice 
will never be fulfilled, and that absolute impartiality, whether natural or artificial, need not be 
our goal. 
 This anti-utopian note may seem dissonant given that, in the previous section, I seemed to 
hold it against parties to a conflict that they can never achieve absolute natural impartiality, 
although they may show both natural and artificial impartiality to a relatively high degree. Might 
the natural impartiality of parties to a given conflict be good enough, just as the natural 
impartiality of spectators has just been defended as good enough? Perhaps, but for the reasons 
outlined in the previous section, the natural impartiality of parties to a conflict is greatest when it 
is least necessary. This is not the case, however, with the natural impartiality of spectators. 
Participants in a conflict will only show a high degree of natural impartiality when their shared 
interest in impartiality is significantly stronger than their conflicting interests, hence rendering 
their conflict a relatively weak one. Yet the natural impartiality of spectators can be very high 
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even while the heat of conflict is very high, as long as the force of competing interests is limited 
to the participants and does not spread to the detached spectators. No matter how intense the 
competition between those trying to be published in a given journal may become, blind 
reviewers naturally have a position above and outside the fray.    
 
Claim 3: Those without natural impartiality can more easily achieve artificial impartiality 
if they can model their artificial impartiality on the natural impartiality of an existing 
spectator. 
 Let us suppose that Firth is correct in his argument that the morally right course of action 
in any given situation is the one which would be approved of by an ideal observer. Such being is 
omniscient (with full knowledge of both all things past and all things future), “omnipercipient” 
(with perfect powers of imagination), perfectly disinterested, perfectly rational, and (now for the 
punchline) “in other respects…normal” (Firth 1952, 344). In order for Firth’s analysis of moral 
rightness to be action-guiding, we must now imagine our way into the perspective of his ideal 
observer, and figure out what this impossible creature would and would not approve of. Given 
that the ideal observer is so radically unlike any of us, and that there is nothing even 
approximating an actual ideal observer available for consultation, it is not clear how the project 
could even get off the ground. Perhaps that is why there has been so little normative theory 
which reaches any concrete moral or political judgments—let alone a full theory of justice—on 
the basis of Firth’s ideal observer theory. 
 The opposite, of course, is true of the equally impossible beings behind Rawls’s veil of 
ignorance in the original position, beings who have served as a starting point for much of the 
normative theorizing of the past four decades of moral and political philosophy. The great 
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advantage of Rawls’s theory over Firth’s is that the former’s is a workable model of artificial 
impartiality designed to produce concrete conclusions. As anyone who has taught an 
introductory class on Rawls knows, however, it is no easy task to imagine one’s way into the 
perspective of the original position. Even those who succeed in doing so often come to different 
normative conclusions depending on the different ways they imagine the original position to 
work.  
It seems clear that an attempt at artificial impartiality would be made much simpler were 
it possible to consult an actually existing, naturally impartial spectator. The claim that it is easier 
to achieve artificial impartiality when a naturally impartial spectator is available—either in 
person or through some sort of indirect communication—is admittedly an empirical one, and 
hence a better subject for experimental testing than for mere philosophical speculation. As far as 
I am aware, however, there have yet to be any psychological studies as to whether those without 
natural impartiality can more easily form impartial judgments about a conflict when they can 
consult the decisions of an existing impartial spectator.  
There is, however, growing evidence that what some psychologists call “surrogation” can 
be an effective means of practical deliberation in other contexts. For example, subjects in one 
study could more accurately predict their affective reactions to a future event when they know 
how a neighbor in their social network reacted to the event than when they know about the event 
itself. Dan Gilbert et al. (2009) found that undergraduates could better predict how they would 
feel about particular partners while speed-dating on the basis of how acquaintances (or 
“surrogates”) felt after dating these individuals than they could on the basis of extensive personal 
profiles. In this and other contexts, the emotional reactions of a surrogate are more useful in 
predicting one’s own emotions than is information about the object of one’s future reaction. 
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Although we must wait for more studies on the matter, there is reason to believe that surrogation 
provides a means of making up for weaknesses in our imaginative abilities. Gilbert et al. 
conclude that “because surrogation does not rely on mental simulation, it is immune to the many 
errors that inaccurate simulations produce” (2009, 1617). 
Of course, it might be questioned to what extent failures in affective forecasting and 
failures in impartiality are analogous to one another, but both can be attributed to failures of 
imaginative accuracy—failure to imagine future events’ effects on oneself accurately in the 
former case, and failure to imagine the effects of one’s judgment on all the parties to a conflict 
accurately in the latter case. If anything, however, surrogation is likely to be an even more 
effective strategy with regards to impartial judgments than it is with regards to self-interested 
affective forecasting. The differences between individuals might make one a poor surrogate for 
predicting another’s happiness, but impartial judgments do not depend on the idiosyncrasies of 
individual psychology in this way. 
Even in cases where an impartial spectator cannot be directly consulted, simply being 
able to model one’s own attempt at an artificially impartial perspective on the existing 
perspective of an actual person may make one’s task much easier. Although it is very difficult 
indeed to know what it would be like to see a conflict from the point of view of a god-like ideal 
observer or an impossibly ignorant agent in the original position, it is much easier to imagine 
what it would be like to see it from a perspective which, while not one’s own, can and has been 
taken by other individuals. It would be easiest if these spectators could be asked for their 
impartial opinions. When this is impossible, their very existence can serve as a guide for coming 
to an artificially impartial perspective of our own.  
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Of course, before impartial spectators can either be consulted or have their perspectives 
recreated imaginatively, they have to be identified. Doing so is no easy task, even with the purest 
of intentions. Since it is not easy to catalogue individual interests, we may never be certain that 
someone truly does not have any interest at stake in a conflict simply because these interests are 
not readily apparent. The situation is made worse once we remember that each party to a conflict 
has an interest in having it resolved in a way biased in her favor. One way to accomplish this is 
to claim falsely that someone who is actually on her side in the conflict qualifies as an impartial 
spectator, and to insist that this partial spectator’s perspective govern the resolution of the 
conflict. In order to avoid such problems, we may have no choice but to rely on a party’s own 
artificial impartiality. It may never be possible to do away with the political need for artificial 
impartiality entirely; it will play an important role even in theorizing about justice that relies 
primarily on natural impartiality. Yet just as the advocates of natural impartiality need not and 
cannot exclude artificial impartiality from both theory and practice, so too should the advocates 
of artificial impartiality not exclude natural impartiality.  
Here is hardly the place to even begin constructing a new theory of justice on the basis of 
primarily natural rather than primarily artificial impartiality. The present essay should be 
considered an invitation for others to do so—to imaginatively consider an impartial alien 
offering advice to Ackerman’s space explorers, or the residents of another island (perhaps within 
shouting distance, but inaccessible across rough, shark-infested waters) helping Dworkin’s 
castaways. Nor should our use of natural impartiality be confined to the speculative fictions of 
philosophers’ imaginations—we should draw on all the empirical literature available from across 
the humanities and social sciences so as to increase our understanding of actually existing, 
naturally impartial spectators and their potential role in resolving conflict.  
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I can make no claims to where this turn to natural impartiality would lead, but I have 
great expectations for the results. It may turn out that Adam Smith’s greatest contribution to 
political philosophy today will be to remind us of a rather obvious fact that we have somehow 
forgotten: Impartial spectators are around us all the time, and it would be foolish to ignore their 
actual, everyday perspectives in order to construct baroquely imagined, often impossible 
perspectives for thinking about justice. 
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